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THE U.S. FISCAL PROBLEM:
WHERE WE ARE, HOW WE GOT
HERE AND WHERE WE'RE GONG
ABSTRACF
Thispaper dealswith several issues regardingthecauses andimplications ofrecentand
projected U.S. federal budget deficits. It considers why deficits have remained so large in spite
of deficit reduction efforts, evaluates the impact of the recent policies of the Clinton
administration, and offers tong-range deficit projections. Among the paper's findings are:
1. Until the past year, deficit projections over the past decade have been consistently too
optimistic; had initial projections for the current fiscal year proved accurate, the deficit-reducing
policies of die early 1 990s already would have driven the federal budget well into surplus; there
is no single explanation for these large and systematic forecasting errors.
2. The budget rules that legislators have developed to control deficits, including those now
in effect, are ill-designed for their apparent purpose. They fail to compensate for forecasting
errors and encourage shifts in the timing of revenues and expenditures. The paper presents
evidence that such shifting has followed the incentives of the different schemes.
3. The projected decline in the deficit as a share of GD? over the next few years reflects
not only the policies already enacted but also the continuation of significant real reductions in
discretionary spending --representinga drop of 2.2 percent of GDP between 1994 and 2004.
4. Even if such optimistic forecasts prove to be correct, longer run projections suggest
that current fiscal policy is unsustainable. Without any growth in the relative price of health
care, the demographic transition still is projected to lead to sharp increases in Social Security and







in fiscal year 1992 the U.S. federalbudget deficit was$290 billiondollars, equalto nearly 5
percent of GD? and contributing to the continued rapid growth in the national debt. By the end of
that fiscal year (on September 30 of the calendar year), the ratio of publicly held national debt to GD?
bad risen from a low of 24.5 percent in 1974 to 51.1 percent.
To altack the deficit, President Clinton proposed, and each house of Congress barely passed in
August, the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA 1993). an act which, according to Executive
branch estimates, will raise revenues and reduce spending by a total of roughly $500 billion over the
five fiscal years from 1994 through 1998.'
Wasthis action necessary? Was it enough? Among the questions addressed in this paper are:
• Whit Is the current path of U.S. fiscal policy?
-How hasthispath beenaltered (thus far) bythe Clintoneconomicprogram?
- Isthecurrent fiscal policy trajectory sustainable and, if not,what isthe magnitudeof
necessarychanges?
Thesequestions are central to thefiscalpolicy debate butdifficultto answer. To identify
fiscal policy's current trajectory,wemust make long-range economic projections as well as
assumptions regardingwhatcurrent policyactuallyis. Moreover, we mustknowbow to interpret this
information.The budget deficit can be defined in a variety of waysandthere is nothing to ensure that
one years budget deficit will be comparabletothe next, or what a short-term trend in the budget
deficitsignifies aboutthelong-run viability of fiscal policy.Conclusionsabout the state of fiscal
policy should not depend on arbitrary accounting conventions or budget 'scoring' rules. Finally, to
1According to the Office of Management and Budget's 1993 Midsession Review (0MB 1993), the
total is $504.8 billion, while the Congressional Budget Office's estimate is $432.9 billion (CBO
1993b).consider the magnitudeofnecessarypolicychanges,wemust be able to gauge howdifferentpolicies
willchange theeconomy's fiscalpath.
As discussed below, the uncertainties involved in each of these stages are considerable. Fiscal
performance has proved difficult to project with any degree of accuracy; budget measures are rife with
ambiguous concepts, making them difficult tointerpretand the measurement of economic responses
to fiscal policies has been a source ofcontroversy.This leaves those who would design policy with a
daunting task, the nature of which is amply illustrated by recent events.
The politicallydifficultdeficit reduction effort of 1993 follows an equally painful OBRA
1990, signed after a protracted "budget summit" by a President who had made a campaign
commitment to 'no new taxes' but who nevertheless agreed to significant revenue increases along with
spending cuts, again estimated at the time to total about $500 billion over a five-year budget period.
With recent Federal budget deficits running in the neighborhood of $2004300 billion per
year, one might think that these two acts, each apparently reducing the deficit by about $100 billion
per year, would have led us close to budget balance in the ensuingyears.Yet the near-term outlook
is for continuedbudgetdeficits of nearly $200 billion dollars, even assuming that the 1990 Act's very
tight caps on discretionary spending, which keep discretionary spending essentially fixed in nominal
terms, are followed through fiscal year 1998.
What's going on? Another of this paper's goals is to find out, to address the question:
- Wby have large deficit reduction policies apparently resulted in 'o little deficit
reduction?
Each of the difficulties cited above might have played a role. First, economic responses to tax
increases may have blunted the force of these deficit-reducing policies. Second, "deficit reduction"
doesn'tnecessarilymean deficit reduction. Budget scoring rules measure the effects of legislation on
the deficit relative to some hypothetical "baseline", which is intended to indicate what the deficit in
2some futureyearwould havebeenhadnopolicy changes beenadopted.If the baselineforecasts
projectsharply increasing deficits,then even significant"deficitreduction"wouldnot necessarily
resultin reduced deficits. Third. we may simply have been the victims of forecasting errors,
expecting deficits to be tower than they wined out to be.
Identifyifig the reasons for the recent Sisyphean fiscal ordeal has implications for future policy
design. Most importantly, the recent success or failure in forecasting budget trends should help
inform our judgment about the accuracy of current forecasts and the extent to which additional policies
are needed to achieve long-mn fiscal viability. Studying recent fiscal performance can also help us
understand the effects of budget accounting rules and procedures. Much of the federal government
effort at budget control during the past decade, beginning with the Gramm-Rudman-llollings
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, has taken the form of procedural changes intended to place
obstacles in the way of deficit spending. In light of recent events, I wilt consider the following
question:
-Bowhave budget control rules affected fiscal policy, and how is the effectiveness of
such rules influenced by ourabIlity to forecastfuture fiscal performance?
After a brief review of recent current budget trends, I turn in Section 2 to a review of the past
decade of budget forecasts and results, in order to sort out the causes of these trends. Section 3
considers the impact of deficit control measures on fiscal policy, in light of recent history. Section 4
describes the recent changes in fiscal policy brought about by the 1993 legislation. In Section 5, I'll
return to the papers initial question of sustainability and, in light of all the difficulties recognized.
discuss the magnitude of the current fiscal imbalance and the changes potentially needed to prOduce a
sustainable fiscal policy. Section 6 offers some conclusions.
31.1. Recent Fiscal Performance
Figure 1 presents annual U.S. federal budget deficits since fiscal year 1983, and deficits
projected through2004by the Congressional Budget Office2 As the figure indicates, the deficit has
ranged between $150 billion and $290 billion throughout the historical period, and between 3 and 6
percent of GD?. Current projections are for the deficit to fall over the next couple of years, both in
nominal dollars and as a share of GD?, then begin rising again by both measures. Ill discuss below
why the deficit is projected to rise, and the extent to which deficit trends accurately represent the path
of fiscal policy. First, however, it is useful to consider the factors that have contributed to the
deficits, measured as they are, experienced over the past decade.
2.ldent:fiuing the Sources of Recent Deficits
Asindicated above, there are three potential explanations for the persistence of deficits of
$200 billion or more in the face of the large deficit reduction packages passed in 1990 and 1993: high
"baselines,' unanticipated behavioral responses, and other forecast errors. I'll consider each of these
explanations. Much of my analysis will be based on the historical record of CBO deficit forecast
revisions.
For several years, CBO has published forecasts of deficits, revenues and expenditures for the
current and five subsequent fiscal years. Typically twice a year, CBO has provided revised estimates,
dividing the revisions from one forecast to the next for a particular future fiscal year into three
categories, according to whether they could be attributed to changes in policy, changes in projected
macroeconomic behavior, or those residual, or 'technical", changes in revenues and spending that
Tbroughout the rest of this paper, 1 will use CBO forecasts except as noted otherwise. These
projections do not incorporate CBO's recent estimates of the impact of the Clinton health proposals.
4could not be explained either by policy changes or macroeconomic changes. Within each category,
revisions are broken into spending and revenue forecast revisions, and sometimes further.
For example,a reductionin projected tax collections due to an unexpected recession would be
classified as an economic change, while a reduction in income taxes caused by a shift in the
distribution of taxable income toward lower marginal tax brackets would count as a technical error,
because the income distribution is not part of the macroeconomic forecast. Policy projections, and
changes in them, reflect notsimply actuallegislation,but a professional judgment ofwhat is likely to
occur.Thisrevision process my be expressed as:
— (1)
fori = 0 to 5. where is the deficitforecastfor year tat the end of year t-i (equal to the actual
deficit 1), for i = 0) and and 1T are the policy,economic,and technical revisions to the
year deficitforecastin yeart-i(denoted l\. T,, and E when i0).
Asimilarprocedure has been followed by 0MB. with similar results, at least in recent years.
IuseCBO figures for two reasons. First,the CBOmethodology is likelytohavebeenmore
consistent overthepastdecade thanthe corresponding 0MBprojectionsofthreedifferentpresidential
administrations. Second,the CBO projectionsare likelytohavebeencloser to true forecasts than the
0MB projections,because the latter were often distorted bybudgetrules reouixin2 that projected
Sbudget deficits meet certain targets.3 Mycommentsshouldnot be takenasa critique of CBO
methods orcompetence.4
2.1. Initial Baselinesand the Effectsof Policy
Tounderstandwhydeficits remain so large, it is helpfizl to begin by applying expression(1)
successively for a givenfiscal yea? s deficit, cumulatingalltherevisionsthat occur during yearsi-S
through t. This yields:
-,4D,+ (2)
One possible reason why deficits remain so large is that initial baseline deficits themselves — the
original projections D1 madefiveyears prior toeachfiscal yeasinquestion — were extremely high.
Thiscould have come about for two reasons. First, the excesses of the past simply might have set
policy on a smooth trajectory that, left to its own, would have produced ever higher deficits. For
example, the Reagan tax cuts of 1981 have often been blamed for subsequent deficits. Alternatively,
previous policies might have included timing shifts in revenues and/or expenditures that reduced near-
term deficits at the expense of deficits beyond the six-year forecasting period. For example, a policy
enacted in 1983 to speed up revenue collections from 1990 to 1987 would reduce the 1987 deficit but
lead to a higher baseline deficit forecast for 1990. when the initial baseline forecast for that fiscal year
first appearedin 1985.
'Reischauer (1990) provides evidence thatthe gap between 0MBbudgetprojectionsandCBO
reestimates of these budgets rose after the enactment of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, which
requiredthat budgetsmeetspecifieddeficit targets.
lndeed,CBO(1993b, Appendix A) provides evidence that its cx post macroeconomic forecasting
record,measured interms of root mean squared errors in the prediction of real GNP, inflation and
short-terminterest rates, is comparable to thatofthe privatesector'Blue Chip' consensus and
somewhatbetterthan thecombinedAdministrationrecord.
6While offering different explanations for why the initial baseline for a particular fiscal year
might be high, each argument suggests that policy changes enacted durinE the six-year forecasting
window between the date of the initial baselineforecastand the end of the fiscal year itself sinipy
were too small to offset the high initial baseline deficits. However, this story is not consistent with
the data for recent fiscal years or for those in the immediate nature.
There have been several policy changes aimed at reducing deficits since the early '80s, in
addition to the changes of £990 and £993 already cited. The importance of these intervening changes
can be seen in Figure 2. This figure presents two series, based on data from February 1983 to
January 1994. The first, labelled "Initial Baseline Deficit," is the deficit for that year as forecast by
CBO six years earlier, J),or,for fiscal years prior to 1988. the deficit forecast in February 1983.
which is as far back as the data go. The second curve in Figure 2, labelled Baseline Plus Policy"
adjusts the initial deficit forecasts for the effects of all policy changes dating from the first forecast for
each fiscal year through the end of the fiscal year itself or, for fiscal years after 1993, through
January 1994. It corresponds to the right-hand-side of expression (2), with the economic and technical
revisions set to zero, cumulating the changes in deficit forecasts that CBO attributed to changes in
policy, from the date at which calculations for that fiscal year began until the end of that fiscal year
or, for current and future fiscal years, until January l994. Thus, a MI six years' estimated policy
effects are presented only for fiscal years 1988-93.
As the figure indicates, fiscal policies since 1983 have, according to estimates, reduced budget
deficits relative to initial baseline in every fiscal year. For the fiscal years 1988-93, the average
reduction over six years was $154 billion. Some of these reductions may simply have acted to offset
the deficit increases embedded in the initial baselines by earlier policy actions. Still, had the policy
effects actually measured been the only changes from initial baseline pn4ections, the federal budget
7would have been in surplus in 1991 and 1992 and wouldbe projectedin surplus for fiscal years 1994
through 1996.
Of course, the policies themselves would probably have been different had there been no jgl
(i.e.,economic and technical) revisions from initial baseline forecasts during this period. That is,
some of the policies aimed at deficit reduction resulted from the realization that things were worse
than originally projected. But this argument does not alter the conclusion that the policies actually
enacted were estimated to be large enough to offset the budget deficits initially projected.
After fiscal year 1996. the initial baseline deficits rise quite sharply. For the future, then, as
I'll discussbelow, thedevil may well be in the baselines (or at least may start there); but for recent
years,weneed to look elsewhere.
2.2.ForecastErrors
The surpluses indicatedbythelowercurvein Figure 2wereexceeded by actual deficits (or
thoseprojectedas of January 1994)bythesum of cumulativeeconomic andtechnicalforecast errors.
Figure 3 presentsthese errorsfor the sameperiod. Moving vertically,the figure shows the
cumulative impact of, respectively, economic errors, technical errors, and the additional interest
payments associated with these two changes. These interest costs include the effects (counted as
economic changes) of revisions in nominal interest rate forecasts, as well as the cumulative debt
service effects resulting from the economic and technical errors.
There are two reasons to consider these changes in interest costs separately. First, errors in
the prediction of debt service costs arise only as the result of underlying errors in other projections.
Second. to the extent that projected nominal interest rates and hence interest costs change because of
changes in the expected inflation rate, the associated change in the projected deficit is a change in the
8nominal deficit but not the real deficit.5 For fiscal years after 1995, declines in projected nominal
interest rates have outweighed increased debt service projections, causing revisions of estimated
interest costs to be slightly negative, thus far.
In studying Figure 3. one needs to keep in mind that, as in Figure 2, only the years 1988-93
offer a full six years of data. Hence, the small errors in the early lOs and late '90s simply reflect the
relatively short intervals over which errors are being cumulated. Focusing again on the period from
1988to1993, then, we observe that both technical and economic forecast errors have been positive in
every one of these fiscalyears.Further,botheconomic and, particularly,technicalerrors have been
very large in recent fiscalyears.Forfiscalyears 1990-93.technicalerrors alone (excluding interest)
accountedfor an average of $132billionper year. Even more disturbing is the fact that for fiscal
years 1994-96, for which fewer than six years' revisions have been counted, the average technical
error equals $166 billion.6
2.3. Decomposin2 Technical Forecast Errors
These large technical prediction errors deserve further attention for several reasons. First of
all, unlike economic forecast errors, which by definition are directly attributable to changes in the
forecasts of aggregate variables, these are the residuals of the forecasting process and therefore not
3preswnably, there are other components of the economic forecast error attributable to changes in
inflation expectations that we would also like to exclude or consider separately for the same reason.
However, at least in recent years, holding nominal interest rates fixed, ebanges in inflation have little
impact on the deficit because they tend to push up revenues and spending by roughly equal amounts."
(CBO 1993b, p. 35). Hence, the ut changes in the primary deficit (i.e., the deficit excluding
interest) associated with changes in macroeconomic forecasts should be due mainly to changes in real
economic variables, such as real growth and the unemployment rate. This will not be true, of course,
for forecasts of nominal revenues and spending, each of which will be quite sensitive to rate of
inflation.
'The cumulative forecast error for fiscal year 1998 is negative, in contrast to the general trend.
This reflects one year's revision (from January 1993 to January 1994), during which technical and
economic forecast errors for fiscal years 1994-1997 were negative as well. Whether these very recent
revisions indicate a shift in the trends of recent years is too early to tell.
9directly linked to any aggregate changes. Their causes are notaseasily identified and could have
different implications for the future. Second, economicforecasterrors may present less reason for
concern or policy reaction, because they reflect, in part, the automatic stabilizers that, atleast from a
Keynesian perspective,aredesirable.On the otherhand, there need be no obvious benefit
associated withforecast errors,conditionalonthe state of the economy.
Finally,to the extentthat recentdeficitshave been caused by inaccurate assessments of
taxpayer responses to tax changes, we would expect this to show up in technicalforecast errors of tax
revenues. For example, suppose an increase in capital gains tax rates reduced capital gains
realizations more than CBO predicted. This would reduce capital gains realizations, given the level of
income and other macroeconomic aggregates, and therefore would lead to overestimates of individual
income tax collections, conditional on macroeconomic conditions, in the years following the enactment
of the tax increase.
Perhaps the biggest single source of technical forecasting error during the past decade was the
Savings and Loan bailout and associated problems. There was, initially, an underprediction of the
cost of the bailout, leading to large forecast errors in the early '90s. Thereafter, there was uncertainty
regarding when Congress would choose to provide the funds already seen as needed, essentially a
timing issue that has led to both positive and negative technical forecast errors in fiscal years after
1992.
However, the S&Lbailoutexplains only a small part of the overall picture. Figure 4 graphs
the cumulative technical forecast errors for fiscal years 1983-98 shown in Figure 3, but excluding both
the associated debt service and the errors atthbutable to the S&L bailout. The figure breaks the
remaining forecast errors into three components: revenue overpredictions, undexpredictions in the cost
of Medicare and Medicaid, and all other.
10The rapid groMbofmedical spending in recent years has (until calendar year 1993) been
underpredicted consistently, leading to the technical errors associated with the Medicare and Medicaid
programs. While theseerrorshave been important, the figure shows that revenue overpredictions
havebeen aneven more significant source of technical forecast errors in recent years. However, even
with these two areas (plus thosealreadyexcluded)accountedfor, a significant residual— around$70
billionin fiscal years 1993 and 1994 —remains.
Although a relatively short period of time is represented in Figure 4, this persistence of large
positive cumulative technical errors calls into question whether these are true forecast errors in terms
of being the results of an optimal forecasting process.
One possibility is that technical errors are systematically positive because baseline forecasts
fail to account for the 'unexpected' emergencies that always arise, in the way that a local government
might not 'expect' snow and hence fail to provide a snow removal budget. Aside from the Savings
and Loan bailout, which is already excluded from Figure 4, recent years have seen hurricanes, floods,
earthquakes, Operation Desert Storm, etc. On the other hand, we have also experienced an
unpredictably rapid decline in defense spending (the peace dividend') due to the deterioration of the
Soviet Union and now Russia as a military threat, which has led to negative technical forecast errors.
Moreover, unlike in the snow removal example, these are deficit forecasts. They are not the
actual budgets presented by presidents who have been accused of adopting a 'rosy scenario' in order
to putoffproposing difficult budget choices, and who have been given further incentive to do so by
budgetrulesrequiring that submitted budgets be claimed to satisfy certaincriteria(see footnote 3
above). There undoubtedly has been political pressure not to forecast realistically large deficits, but it
is difficult to know how important a role such pressure has played In producing the forecasting record
observed during the past decade.
112.4. The StatisticalProperties of RevenueForecast Errors
Whateverthe importanceof the "one unexpected emergency after another" hypothesis on the
spending side, it is difficult to think of comparable examples on the revenueside,given that these
errors are residualsafteraccounthasbeen taken of macroeconomic and policy effects. Further, while
CBO provides a breakdown of spending forecast errors by source (defense, medical, etc.) there is
usually no explicit breakdown given for revenues.
In the aggregate, though,these revenue forecasterrors have typically been negative (i.e.,
revenues were overpredicted). not just cumulatively for each fiscal year, but for each individual
revision as well. Table I presents the average k-year-ahead forecast revisions during the sample
period, for k ranging from 0 (the current fiscal year) to 5 (the most distant fiscal year being
predicted). For each value of k, average economic and technical revisions are negative and policy
revisions are positive.7 Presumably, the economic revisions are attributable to unexpectedly weak
growth and lower inflation after the mid '80s, while the policy revisions simply reflect the continual
process of attempts at deficit reduction.
Whence the technical errors? As a first step toward answering this question, Table 2 presents
the results of regressions in which each technical revision for each fiscal year is represented as an
individual observation. Explanatory variables in the first specification include a constant and lagged
values of the three forecast revisions for the same fiscal year.
'These calculations are based on the evidence through fiscal year 1993. The revisions are smaller,
on average, for the 5-year-ahead estimates because these typically reflect only a partial year's
information. The first forecast for the fiscal year 5 years into the future is typically published in
January. whereas the fiscal year begins on October 1. For example, CBO's first published estimate
for fiscal year 1998 appeared in January 1993. Hence, the 5-year-ahead revision for fiscal year 1998
reflectschanges only from January 1993 through late September 1993. The flscal-year-1993 revisions
of projected deficits in fiscal years 1993-1997 (0 through 4 years ahead) include revisions from
September 1992 through September 1993.
12As the first column of the table shows, technical revisions are essentially unpredictable using
this information —theequation's It2 is -.01, and no variable has a statistically significant impact.
However, adding a simple time u-end to the regression explains one-third of the variance of the
technical forecast errors. In this second specification, the technical error, aside from u-ending sharply
downward over time, relates negatively to all three components of the lagged forecast revision,
suggesting that revisions are systematically too large in absolute value. Interestingly, though, the one
such relationship that would have the most straightforward explanation —theoverstatement of
revenues attributable to policy changes because of an underprediction of the magnitude of behavioral
effects —isthe least significant, both statistically and quantitatively.
What can we conclude from this exercise? First, that technical errors seem clearly not to be
optimal forecast errors in the sense of being drawn from a distribution having zero mean and
independent of available information. On average, they are significantly negative and related to past
information. Second, at least in the aggregate, underprediction of behavioral responses to taxation
does not seem to have played a crucial role in producing the consistent overprediction of revenues.'
Finally, the errors themselves have been getting worse over time. While it is implausible that such a
trend could continue for very long (and recent evidence encourages the hope that it may be ending),
one still is led, pending a better understanding of the process, to be concerned about what revisions lie
in store, and to be skeptical of any conclusions about the sustainability of fiscal policy based on point
'This finding does not demonstrate that behavioral effects have been accurately predicted in all
instances, or that potential prediction errors are not an important factor in evaluating future policy.
Rather, it simply indicates that there is much more to the historical puzzle. Indeed, an important
component of CBO's forecasting errors following the Tax Reform Act of 1986 can be attributed to
overestimated capital gains tax realizations. Also after 1986, individual income tax revenues rose
more than originally predicted, which some (e.g. Feenberg and Poterba 1993, Feldstein 1993) have
attributedtothe behavioral response of high-income taxpayers. However, this is masked in the data
by thefactthat corporate income tax revenues fell unexpectedly.
13estimates of revenues or expenditures. I will return tothisissue below when evaluating the current
state of policy and recent fiscal changes.
3. Budget Rules and Their Impact on Policy
Sincethe advent of largefederal budgetdeficits in the earlyl980s, the federal government has
reliedon a succession ofbudgetcontrol measuresin its attempts to achieve fiscal balance. Recently.
despite the1993 extensionof the provisions of the 1990BudgetEnforcementAct, there have been
renewed callsforaneven stronger measure, namely a balancedbudgetamendment.
Presumably, budgetrulesare imposed bylegislators (and presidents)to forcethemselves to
acceptmorefiscal austeritythanthey wouldagreeto in the normal course ofevents. The notion is
that while a majority of legislatorsmayagreeon the needforoverall limits,thelegislative process
fails toproduce a majority coalition inopposition to any particular deficit-increasing provision. While
thepoliticaleconomy of this process is notparticularly well understoodandthus meritsfurther
attention9,I will confine my discussion to how well the ruleshavebeendesignedtoachievetheir
apparent objective. The persistence of significant deficits throughout the pastdecade suggests the
absence of complete victory, to say the least.
Thissection describes the different budgetcontrol measuresthathave beenusedsincethemid-
'SOs,and considers the impact that they have had on fiscal policy. It also draws out the implications
for the designofsuch measures of two important factors. One is the difficulty of making accurate
budgetpredictions, which wasdiscussed in the previous section. The other,whichis illustrated
below, is thedemonstrated abilityofgovernment toalter thetimingofmeasureddeficits withminimal
changesin theunderlying fiscalpolicy itself.Eachofthesefactors bas confounded past budget
control mechanisms and,indeed, led toperverseresults.
9SeeGramlich (1990) for some further discussionalongthese lines.
143.1. Bud2et Rules
The first attempt atimposing an external mechanism tocontrol thebudgetdeficit was the
Balanced Budget andEmergencyControl Actof1985. commonly known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
(GEl-I). Enacted in December 1985, it imposed specific deficit targets for fiscal years beginning in
the santefiscal year(1986), declining linearly to zero by fiscal year 1991.If, atthe beginning of a
fiscal year, the target forthat year wasjudgedby 0MB not approximately to havebeen met,
automatic,across-the-board budget cuts (sequestration) would follow. Once the target was declared
met for a particular fiscal year, subsequent forecast revisions during the remainder of that fiscal year
were ignored.
Failure to meet the original URN targets for fiscal year 1988 led to amended targets in 1987,
declining to zero by fiscal year 1993. Failure to meet the revised targets led ultimately to the
supplanting of GRJ-1 by the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act (BEA). Under BEA, there are specific
caps on discretionary spending that translate into real annual spending reductions, along with a Pay-as-
You-Go (PAYGO) process for revenues and entitlements (excluding Social Security,whichis treated
separately and in similar fashion) that prohibits policy changes from increasing the estimated deficit in
any year during the six-year period (covering the current and five subsequent fiscal years) for which
official deficit forecasts are made.
Unlike GRI1. BEA effectively imposes no deficit targets—only the requirement that any
year's policy changes not increase the estimated current and near-term deficits relative to the levels
forecast at the beginning of the current fiscal year. For example, policy changes enacted during fiscal
year 1992 could not increase the estimated deficits in any of the fiscal years from 2992 through1997
over the levels predicted for these deficits at the beginning of fiscal year 1992.
153.2. TheImpact of ForecastErrors
The large forecast errors discussed in the previous section clearly have confounded the
operationof CR11 and BEAin reducing deficits. Consider first the impact under CR11. The GRH
budgetrule canbe written:
￿1); — (3)
where [1 is the deficit target for year t. Given that the actual deficit in year t, D, equals the previous
yea? s estimate plus economic, technical and policy revisions,
— (4)
itfollows that, if (3) is just satisfied, then:
I), = (5)
That is. the CR11 target for year tismissed by the extent of technical and economic forecast errors.'°
Under BEA, the deficit policy rule is much simpler, namely:
f_apt s o (6)
for i = 0 to 5. If this condition is satisfied by equality, then expression (2) becomes:
5
I), - (E,..,+T,,) (7)
'°Whilethere might be stabilization arguments for not offsetting some components of the economic
forecast errors, the same argument presumably would call for a simultaneous adjustment to future
years' targets as their economic forecasts were revised in year t.
16Thus, the BEA rule incorporates the cumulative effect of the full six years' prediction errors
of a fiscal year's deficit, rather than just thoseoccurringin the fiscal year itself. Even if each
individual prediction error were unbiased, this cumulation would increase the magnitude of
deviations." But the sample mean of $123.8 billion dollars in cumulative economic and technical
forecast errors for a typical fiscal year (see Table 1) implies that the rule also systematically has led to
a deficit exceeding the initial baseline forecast by this amount. Moreover, in comparing equations (5)
and (7), it is important to realize that there is nothing to suggest that the initial baseline forecast bears
any relation to an optimal deficit target. Thus, in practice, the BEA validates deficits substantially
higher than those initially forecast, which may themselves be viewed as far too high. Indeed, one
reason for their being too high is that policy actions prior to the date of initial forecast may have
shifted the timing of deficits from earlier years.
3.3. The Timin2 of Deficit Reductions
In addition to impounding forecast errors in the eventual deficits, both CR11 and SEA
provided policymakers seeking to avoid the austerity of "permanent" deficit reduction with the
incentive and the opportunity to alter the timing of revenues and expenditures without necessarily
affecting their long run levels or even their present values.
Under GR}I, a particular fiscal year's deficit target could be met by increasing deficits in
subsequent years. The classic mechanism for doing so was the sale of government assets which, in
the most straightforward case, would reduce a current year's deficit and increase the deficits of
remaining years by an amount equal in present value. According to Reiscbauer (1990). fully half of
the deficit reduction under OR!-! fell into the "one-time savings" category including asset sales and
moving agencies off-budget.
tlflj5followsdirectly from the fact that the optimal forecast errors of the year t deficit made in
years t-5 through t should be temporally uncorrelated.
17Some have argued that this use of "smoke and minors" could have been curtailed through
better budget rule design. For example, a capital budget would have eliminated the deficit impact of
pure asset sale transactions. However, there were many "legitimate"fiscal changes during this
period, not generally criticized as "budget gimmicks", that had the same timing effects. An example
is the provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 that repealed the investment tax credit immediately
and retroactively and partially compensated for this tax increase by reducing the corporate tax rate."
This illustrates the futility of trying to distinguish between "good" and "bad" budget changes in an
annual context.
The experience under ORB led to the BEA's use of a multiyear approach. However, even
under the BEA. incentivesfor shiftingremain. Now, they simply must occur from fiscal years
beyond the six-year budget window over which the restrictions on policy apply. However, because
the shifting of deficits would be made only to those budget years for which an official deficit forecast
has yet to be made, it is impossible to identify such shifting from the policy changes actually
recorded. These shifts of deficits to "outside the budget window" would ultimately show up indirectly
through unusually high initial deficit forecasts for those future fiscal years.
The fact that the restrictions that the BEA places in the future are then based on these initial
baseline deficits leads to the perverse result (not present under CR11, which relied on predetermined
deficit targets) that policies that decrease current deficits at the expense of future ones are then
sustained by the budget rules once those future years enter the budget window.
"Since the investment tax credit reduces taxes on investments when they occur, while a corporate
tax cut reduces taxes on investments over time, a policy of reducing the ITC and the corporate tax at
the same time, keeping the present value of taxes collected from each new investment constant,
accelerates the tax collections from new investment. The provisions of the "86 Act were somewhat
more complicated in that they repealed the ITC retroactively and extended the corporate tax reduction
to existing assets.
18For example,the current budget window includes fiscalyears1994-99.Atax speed-up
enactedthis year from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 1999 might be used to raise enough revenue in
1999 to offset some other, deficit-increasing policy of equal magnitude in the same fiscal year. As a
result,thecombined policy would cause no net change in the estimated fiscal year 1999 deficit, and an
increasein the baseline deficit for fiscalyear 2000,when initiallyreported. The BEArules would
thenbe based on this initial forecast, and therebywould sustainthe previous year's deficit increasing
policy.Indeed, if the collectionof allthe incometaxesfromfiscalyear2000 werespeededupto
fiscalyear 1999, the initial baseline deficit forfiscalyear2000 would reflectthe absenceofany
incometax collections.
1-low much shifting has occurredunderthe different budget rules? We cannot observe the
magnitude of shifts under BEA, for they would occurfromfuture years for which estimateshavenot
generally been available. Within the six-year budget window, we can only observe the shifts induced
by OR]-!, which would take the formof deficit reductions in thecurrent fiscalyear achieved atthe
costof increased deficitsinsubsequentfiscalyears.
Figure5 presents the pattern of deficit reduction(excludinginterest) during three regimes:
pre-GRH, OR]-! and BEA. For each of these eras, I have aggregated the policy changes, in each case
recording the impact of the change on the current year'sdeficit and those ofthe five subsequent fiscal
years.In terms of the notation introduced above,thepolicychangesalongeach curveare theaverage
valuesof P1, 1P,.1, P1.,, 1P1, and 1P,5 during the regime, expressed in terms of deficit
Suction (i.e., in negative terms) and as a percentage ofthetotal.'3
The incentives under ORB for shifting into the current fiscal year suggest that agreatershare
of such deficit reduction would occur during thecurrentfiscal year under ORB than before ORB. On
t3Because of the difficulty of classification, I have omitted the changesthat occurred
contemporaneouslywiththe enactmentof bothORB and BEA.
'9the other hand, BEA's restrictions on shifting from any of the next five years would, if anything.
make shifting from these fiscal years less likely even than before CR11. when no explicit restrictions
on shiftingexisted.
Indeed,Figure 5bearsthese predictions out. Before GEM, the average policy change
involved an increase in the current year's deficit and reductions in the deficits of the next five years.
Under GEM, enacted policies had little effect on the deficit five years out but a considerable impact on
the current year's deficit. Under BEA, we have reverted to a situation in which the average impact of
policy is to increase the current year's deficit", but the pattern of deficit reduction is shifted even
more toward the later years of the sample than before GEM. In a sense, the adoption of the BEA has
succeededin eliminatingtiming shifts within the budget window. But this change does not indicate
the absenceofshiftsfrom fiscal yearsmore than five yearsintothe future, and couldbe one
explanation for why the initial baselinesjumped suddenly in fiscal year1997, the first initialbaseline
toappear after the adoption of the new budgetrules(see Figure 2).
3.4. Summary
The budget rules of the past decade have not succeeded in achieving sustained deficit
reduction. The "budget gimmicks" and unrealistic deficit targets of CR11 give way to the less
ambitiousbut longer-horizon constraintsof the BEA. However, the BEAk still permits policies that
shift deficits'outside thebudget window" and sustainsthesepoliciesby relying oninitial baseline
estimates rather than budget targets. Moreover, it provides no error-correction mechanism to deal
with the six years of forecast errors that occur after a fiscal year's deficit is first officially forecast.
"These deficit increases are possible, given the restrictions against enacting a policy to increase
the deficit, because of various loopholes in the rules, such as the ability to suspend the rules in cases
of "emergency".
20These incentives to shift deficits from one year to another have translated into policy actions,
as measuredbypatterns of deficit reduction within the six-year budget window. Much of these shifts
resulted from'legitimate' budget changes notviewed as budget'gimmicks,'illustrating one ofthe
weaknessesofbudget control measuresbased on annual or multiyeardeficitsrather than on long-mn
fiscal consequences. Under BEA,though, the full impactisdifficultto ascertain preciselybecausethe
increased deficitsarebeyondtheofficialforecasthorizon.
4.OBRA1993anditsMedium-Run Effects
The Clinton program enacted in OBRA 1993 was the first important change in fiscal policy
since the 1990 budget agreement. As the introduction indicated, the legislation was estimated to have
provided as much as $500 billion in deficit reduction over the five fiscal years between 1994 and
1998. It includes a variety of tax increases, reductions in the level of discretionary spending, and
reductions in spending on entitlements, particularly Medicare.
4.1. Sources of Short-Term Deficit Reduction
Before considering the long-mn impact of the Clinton plan, it is important to ask how realistic
its projected savings are, even in the short nm. Put another way, how likely is it that the recent
pattern of upward forecast revisions of deficits continue.
On the revenue side, there has been the critique, already cited above, of the projected
revenues from the legislations large increases in the top individual marginal tax rates. For example,
Feldstein (1993) argues that virtually no net revenue will be collected as a result of the tax increase.
representing a gap of over $20 billion per year at 1993 income levels relative to estimates ignoring
21any behavioral effects." His estimates are based on the responsiveness of taxpayers to the marginal
tax rate reductions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
Given the relatively small overall labor supply and savings elasticities typically found in the
empirical literature, bow can Feldstein's estimated revenue effects be justified? There are two main
arguments, both based on the fact that the 1993 tax changes are highly progressive.
First, absent any behavioral effects, a progressive tax change will raise less revenue from
affected taxpayers than would a proportional tax change on the same group that produced the same
increase in their marginal tax rate, since the average tax rate will be lower than the marginal tax rate.
Butthe policieswill havethe samesubstitution effect of behavior. Hence, if the two policies lead to
the same behavioral reduction in before-tax income, the associated percentage reduction in the revenue
gain will be larger under the progressive tax increase. This is just another way of saying that the
deadweightloss of progressive taxation is greaterthan that ofproportionaltaxation.
Inaddition, theimplied behavioralresponses oftaxpayers, particularlythose in thehighest
incomeclasses, to the 198116 as wellasthe 1986reductionsin marginal tax rates, are much larger
than would be implied by labor supply and savings elasticities. The usual explanation is that much of
the taxpayer response took the form of income shifting from tax-favored to fully taxable (and
observed) categories, rather than changes in underlying work and saving behavior.
Is behavior after the 1986 Act a good predictor of what will happen after the 1993 Act?
Given the many other provisions contained in each piece of legislation, and other economic changes
that have occurred simultaneously, it is extremely hard to know. There are differences in the two
pieces of legislation that could push the results in either direction. For example, some of the increase
"The CBO projections, based on revenue estimates produced by the Joint Tax Committee,
presumably incorporate some assumed behavioral changes, but they are clearly smaller than those for
which Feldstein argues.
"See Lindsey (1987).
22in taxable income in higher income classes after the 1986 Act undoubtedly resultedfromthe Act's
restrictionsontax shelter activity, which were not reversed by the 1993 Act. On the other hand,
because the 1993 Act is very progressive, its income effects on labor supplyandsavingbehavior are
likely to be smaller relative to its substitution effects, compared to the those of the 1986 Act. As long
as leisure and consumption are normal goods, this would lead to greater behavioral responses, given
the marginal tax rate changes, than occurred after the 1986 Act.
In summary, it is difficult to know whether we will observe large "technical" adjustments to
revenue forecasts over the next few years as a result of the assumptions underlying present
projections. There is also the question of whether any large behavioral changes that do occur
represent permanent changes, or simply temporary ones)7
WhileOBRA 1993's projected revenue increases derive from changes in specific tax njles,
some of the estimated spending reductions simply reflect the legislation's changes in the targets for
future spending levels, which both CBO and 0MB have chosen to incorporate into their baseline
forecasts. Foremost among these — and representing about a third of the estimated non-interest deficit
reduction by 1998 — is the "bard freeze" in overall discretionary spending that would keep
discretionary spending roughly constant in nominal terms between fiscal years 1993 and 1998 —
representing a drop of roughly 2 percent of GDP, or about a 22 percent cut in the level of
discretionary spending relative to what would prevail if suck spending remained at its 1993 share of
GD?.
"Feenberg and Poterba (1993) provide evidence that the surge of reported income among high
income taxpayers occurred largely in 1987 and 1988, and actually receded in 1989. This is relevant
to the results Feldstein presents, which compare the behavior of taxpayers in the years 1985 and 1988.
234.2. Timing and DeficitsBeyond1998
The previousdiscussiondealt with the extent to which the estimated effects of OBRA 1993 on
near-term budget deficits is plausible. Even if these estimates are accurate, a second question is the
extent to which such deficit reductions help address the federal government's long-mn fiscal problems,
as opposed simply to reducing deficits temporarily or shifting deficits to fiscal years beyond 1998 that
lie beyond the official budget forecasting horizon.
Because much of OBRA 1993's estimated deficit-reduction on the spending side simply takes
the form of reduced spending targets, rather than specific reductions, it is difficult to identify the
longer run effects of the legislation on spending. On the revenue side, though, it is easy to identify
specific provisions of the legislation that do not increase revenues beyond 1998 as much as they do
during the budget period, or lose more revenue afteT 1998 than they do during the budget period.
For example, both corporate and individual estimated tax provisions have been tightened,
leading to a one-time speed-up in the timing of tax collections as a greater share of each year's tax
payments are made in advance. Securities dealers holding appreciated securities in inventory must
move from a cash basis to an accrual basis in paying tax on these gains, again a one-time speed-up
revenue collections. The tax treatment of intangible assets was altered in a way that raised more
revenue during the budget period than afterward, when it may well lose several billion dollars per
year.' These four revenue provisions alone have been estimated by the Joint Tax Committee (1993)
to raise approximately $14.8 billion over the period 1994-98. The small business capital gains tax
"There were two factors that led to this result. First, the provisions could be applied up to two
years retroactively at the discretion of the taxpayer. As a result, firms whose past acquisitions of
intangible assets would benefit from the new provisions were induced to settle court cases and pay the
now-Iowa taxes due on these past transactions, thereby speeding up tax payments but lowering them
in present value. Second, by shifting from a system under which some intangible assets (i.e.
goodwill) could not be amortized at all and others were amortized over short lifetimes to one under
which most intangibles were written off over 15 years, the legislation raised more revenue in the short
run than the long run. See Gravelle (1993) for further discussion.
24cut, one of thekeytaxincentives of the Clinton program, loses lessthana billion dollars over the five
years through1998 — becausestockmust be held for at least five years after theeffective dateto
qualifyfor the 50 percent capital gains tax exclusion.Presumably, oncethe five year waiting period
is over, the revenue loss will burgeon.19And, while theextension of the low-income housing credit is
projected to lose$4.9 billion between 1994 and 1998, its annual cost will reach much higher levels in
theyears thatfollowbecause more andmorevintagesofhousing wilt bereceiving thismulti-year
creditsimultaneously.
Howmuchimpactdothese and other such provisions have on future deficits? As discussed
above, official forecastsofthe impactofOBRA 1993 in fiscal years beyond 1998 do notexist.
However, an estimate canbemade usingtheoverall, unofficial' 10-year budget forecaststhat CR0
recentlyhasbegunpublishing. While CR0 doesnot explicitly identify how much of the revisionsin
these forecasts overtime areattributableto economic, technical andpolicychanges, a roughdivision
can be made. The Appendix describes the method used. The resulting estimatesofthe policy impact
of OBRA 1993forfiscal years 1999-2003. expressed as a share of GDP, areshown in Figure 6,
along withCEO's officialestimates for the period 1994-1998?
In Figure6. the revenue increaseattributableto OBRA 1993 clearlyfalls after 1998. The
magnitudeofthisdropamountstoabout 15-20 billion dollars peryear in 1994 dollars,whichis
plausiblegiven the magnitude of the variousspeed-up provisions reviewedabove and thecrudeness of
the calculation. However,thereis no such dropon thespending side where, remarkably,the
magnitudeoftheprojected deficit reduction continuesto grow, not simply in absoluteterms but asa
"The small immediate revenue loss estimated results fromtheassumption that some gaiiis that
otherwisewould have been realized willbedeferred inordertoreceivethe tax cut.
'°Thelackof smoothness in the projected revenue and expenditure patterns in 1999 presumablyis
attributable to the roughnessof theprojectiontechniquebeing used.
25share of GD? —from1.53 percent of GDP in fiscal year 1998 to 2.04 percent in 2003. A large part
of this comes from a projected slowing of Medicare growth after 1998.
Are these spending forecasts plausible? In addition to the slower growth of Medicare, they
include the prediction (carried over from before OBRA)thatdiscretionary spending wilt continue to
fall after 1998 as a share of GD?, from 6.9 percent to 6.3 percent —anet reduction of 2.5 percent of
GD? over the 10-year period beginning in fiscal year 1993, and a drop of 4.2 percent of GDP from
fiscal year 1985. Whether such continued reductions are feasible remains to be seen. However, it is
clear that theycannot continueforever, even if the projections through 2003 prove to be accurate.
5. The Suslainability of Current Fiscal Policy
Despite the persistence of deficits in recent years, many observers find reasons for optimism
about fiscal policy's long-mn trajectory. After all, the frderal deficit, which exceeded 5 percent of
GD? for each year of the period 1983-86 and neared this level again in the early '90s. is projected to
fall to 2.2 percent of GDP by 1998. The deficit for 2003, which before the passage of OBRA was
projected to rise to 6.9 percent of GD?, is now forecast to rise only to 3.1 percent. Moreover, the
primary deficit (the deficit excluding net interest paid), a key measure for empirical tests of
sustainability, is now (in fiscal year 1994) only .4 percent of GDP and is projected to pass into
surplus in fiscal year 1995 and stay there through 2003.
However, longer run projections do not support optimistic conclusions based on such short-mn
measures. There are two basic reasons for this. One is the continuing rapid growth of government
medical care expenditures. The other is the shift of the social security system from its recent cash-
flow surpluses to significant cash-flow deficits. Each of these changes illustrates the difficulty of
evaluating sustainability based on the behavior of current or past deficits, as empirical tests typically
have tried to do.
265.1. Sustainability and the Intertemporal Bud2et Constraint
Most discussion of the sustainability of fiscal policy begins with the presentation of the
governments intertemporal budgetconstraint,
B, +S (1 +rfl'DP0 (8)
whereBL is the debt outstanding at the beginning of year t, DP1 is the primary deficit at the end of
year t, and r is the discount rate. This constraint is derived simply by applying the annual budget
constraint relating B, and B11 forward successively and then imposing the terminal condition,
urn (1 +r)""BT=O. 1—
Apolicy that does not satisfy this terminal condition is not sustainable, for it implies that the
debt will explode at a rate faster than r. Hence, one strategy of testing for sustainability. putsimply,
has been to see whether the behavior of B1 over time has been consistent with the terminal condition
being met —basicallywhether the national debt, given its past time series properties, is predicted to
grow faster than the appropriate discount rate (see, e.g., Hamilton and Flavin 1986; Wilcox 1989).
An intrinsic problem with such tests, however, is their reliance on past behavior of the debt as a
predictor of the future. This is a particular problem now, as demographic shifts alter the level and
growth rare of entitlement spending.
Moreover, these tests are very susceptible to the changes in the timing of deficits so easily
accomplished by policymakers rn the past. The underlying hypothesis being tested relates to the sum
of the initial stock of debt and the present value of future primary deficits —theleft hand side of(S)
above. But, without changing the value of this sum, it is very easy to change B, and each annual
primary deficit, and hence the short-run behavior of both the debt and the deficit.
27The problem here is much more serious than needing to make corrections for "budget
gimmicks" that distort the "true" pattern of deficits. As discussed above in SectionS, there are many
"legitimate' policychangesthat have precisely the same time pattern of deficit effects. There really is
no true pattern of deficits, only what particular policies and conventions define.
For example, replacing the social security system with an actuarially fair public pension
system investing in government debt plus an old age transfer program to the elderly (to replicate the
net transfers implicit in the current social security system) would have no effect on the sum of the
national debt plus the present value of future primary deficits —indeed,it would have no real effects
at all —butit would raise the national debt immediately by the stock of outstanding unfunded
liabilities of the social security system, and offset the surpluses presently being recorded with even
larger accumulating liabilities to the working population. Hence, our conclusions, not only about the
level of deficits but also about their trajectory, would be strongly affected.
In short, while the intertemporal budget constraint is well-defined, the level of any year's debt
or deficit is not (Kotlikoff 1986). There are many examples from actual and proposed legislation of
policies that are essentially equivalent to one another, except for their consequences for the timing of
measured deficits.2' The only solution is to measure the entire left-band side of(S) —tolook at
projected fiscal policy into the very distant future?2
5.2. Long-Run Fiscal Projections
To evaluate the sustainability of fiscal policy, I form projections of primary Federal deficits
after 2004, the last fiscal year for which CBO estimates exist. To highlight the importance of
entitlement spending, I assume —probablyoptimistically, given the low level of discretionary
21See Auerbach and Koiiikoff (1987) and Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1991).
Even this statement is true only under the assumption, which seems reasonable, that satisfaction
of the terminal condition will not be influenced by changes in budget accounting conventions.
28spending relativetoGD? forecast for 2004 —thatall non-interest spending other than Medicare,
Medicaid and OASDI (Social Security) remain constant at their projected 2004 shares of GD?, and
that all revenues except OASDI payroll taxes do so as well. Hence, I assume primary deficits as a
share of GD? grow after 2004 exactly to the extent that Medicare plus Medicaid and OASDI benefits
less payroll taxes do so.
For social security benefits, I use the Social Security Tnistees' 1993 middle ('Alternative II")
projections, which extend through the year 2OlO. For federal Medicare and Medicaid spending, I
use the middle projections for real spending through the year 2030 made by the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) in 1991, the most recent such projections publicly available. Between 2030
and 2070, I assume that Medicaid stays constant as a share of GD?, and that Medicare grows at the
same rate as OASDI benefits. This assumption basically means that post-2030 growth in federal
medical costs comes from demographic shifts —thegrowing share of elderly in the population —
ratherthan changes in the relative price of medical care. After 2070, I assume that OASDI,
Medicare, and Medicaid all row at the same rate as GD?.
These projections, along with those resulting for the primary deficit, are shown in Figure 7.
The Social Security system's current cash flow surpluses are projected to turn to deficits by 2017,
which continue growing in magnitude thereafter. The swing increases the primary deficit by 1.7
percent of GD? by 2030, and 2.3 percent by 2070. At the same time, federal spending on Medicare
rThese projections give taxes (income), benefits (outgo) and the balance between taxes and
benefits as a share of GD? every five years. I interpolate to obtain values for the years in between.
2'Medicaid spending financed by state governments is excluded from the calculations.
'l'hese are the same projections used in the 'Generational Accounting' calculations of the federal
budget during the past three fiscal years. See, for example, 0MB (1994). Because the HCFA
projections for 2004, primarily for Medicaid, differ from those currently offered by CBO. I
benchmark the 2004 numbers to the CBO projections, and adjust all subsequent years' HCFA
projections by the same fraction of real GD? as the 2004 adjustments represent. The projections for
real GD? are based on CBO's assumed growth rate for the period 1998-2003 of 2.3 percent per year.
29and Medicaidis predictedtocontinuetogrow faster than GD? through 2030, due to growth in both
the real cost of healthcare and theratioof beneficiariestothe total population. This growth in
medicalcare spending increasestheprimarydeficitby 2.3percent ofGD? between2004 and 2030.
MItt 2030,demographicshiftsalone add another .2 percent of GD? to the primary deficit.
Together, these two factors are projected to increase the primary deficit steadily over the
period from .2 percent of GD? in 2004 to 4.2 percent of GDP in 2030 and 5.0 percent by 2070.
Indeed, the prospects may be even worse. These calculations incorporate projections for the growth
of real health care spending between 2004 and 2030 that were based on a lower assumed rate of GD?
growth than the 2.3 percent assumed here. In a sense, I am assuming that faster GD? growth will not
lead to faster growth in Medicare and Medicaid. If, instead, I incorporate the original projections of
Medicare and Medicaid spending, relative to GD?. through2030,the result will be faster growth in
health care entitlements and primary deficits that are nearly 2 percent of GD? higher by 2030. as
indicatedbythe upper dashed line in Figure 7.
Even if the relative price of medical care were completely stabilized in 2004, rather than
203021 (as represented by the lower dashed line in Figure 7), the primarydeficitwould still grow to
3.2 percentofGD? by 2030 and 3.9 percent by 2070.
5.3. Addressin the LonE-Run Imbalance
Withprimarydeficits projected to grow continually over the next several decades, fiscal
policy is not onasustainablepath. Theselargeprojected primary4eficits, in combination with the
initial stock of outstanding debt, would cause the fill deficit, including interest, to grow explosively
relative to GD?. For example, under the base case projections in Figure 7 and a real interestrate
exceeding the real GD? growth rate by 1 percentage point, the debt-GD? ratio would grow from .55
21For this simulation, Medicaid is held constant as a share of GD? at its projected 2004 level, and
Medicare is assumed to grow at the same rate as OASDI benefits starting in 2004, rather than 2030.
30in 2004 to 1.31 at the end of 2030 (the beginning of 2031) and 4.1 at the end 012070. For an
inflation rate of 2.5 percent, this would translate into full nominal deficits rising from 3.3 percent of
GDP in 2004 to 11.5 percent of GD? in 2030 and 28.5 percent of GD? in 2070!
One way of interpreting an imbalance of this magnitude is in terms of the immediate,
permanent reduction in the primary deficit (brought about through tax increases and/or spending
reductions) that, if projections prove accurate, would be needed to bring the debt-GD? ratio at some
date T in the future doit to its level at some initial date I, in this case 2004. This needed reduction







where g is the growth rate of GDP and d, is the primary deficit-GD? ratio in year s.
As discussed in Blanchard ul(1990),a terminal date of T=co corresponds to satisfying the
intertemporal budget constraint, (8). Given the projected growth of primary deficits between 2004
and 2070, hitting the target debt-GD? ratio at some intermediate date will require a lower tax
increase, but still leave the job partially unfinished.
Table 3 presents the permanent reductions in the primary deficits indicated by this procedure,
for terminal dates of 2031 •2071and w,fordifferent assumptions about medical care spending and
different government discount rates. As a comparison of the upper and lower panels of the table
indicates, a lower interest rate assumption (with the interest rate exceeding the growth rate by I
percent rather than 2 percent) reduces the needed deficit Suction for the shortest horizon, but
increases it over the longest horizon. This is because, in the short run, the lower cost of servicing the
existing debt dominates the calculation (see (9)).Overthe longer run, the future primary deficits
31dominate thecalculationand, with a lower interestrate, those farinthe future— whichare larger as a
shareof GD? — matter relatively more.
Even under the more optimistic assumptions about the growth of Medicare and Medicaid, an
immediate, permanent reduction of nearly 4 percentage points in the primary deficit-GDP ratio is
needed to satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint (8) (i.e., for T=w). The magnitude of this
change can be understood by noting that the federal individual income tax now raises just over 8
percent of GD?. Hence, individual income taxes would need to be raised permanently by nearly 50
percent. Alternatively, OASDI benefits would have to be cut permanently by about 60 percent.
5.4. What Policy Changes Are Needed?
A natural reaction by policy makers is to dismiss pessimistic calculations based on long-term
forecasts, because the forecasts involve so much uncertainty. Indeed, the bounds on long-nan
projections are wide. For example, the Social Security Trustees' more optimistic ("Alternative I')
projections show the OASDI system in positive balance until around 2028, and back in positive
balance again about ten years later. Under such projections, even with no change in the medical
projections through 2030 or any of the other assumptions made above, the fiscal imbalance as
measured by A would be reduced by 1.1 to 1.6 percent of GDP. On the other hand, under the more
pessimistic ('Alternative Ill') Social Security projections, A would rise by 1.6 to 2.3 percent of GD?.
But the uncertainty inherent in long-run projections doesn't imply that no policy actions are necessary
until the uncertainty is resolved, merely that further actions will be inevitable.
The calculations for T=a, made at any particular date tindicatethe magnitude of the
permanent reduction in the primary deficit-GD? ratio, say A1, that is needed for currently projected
fiscal policy to satisfy the government's intertemporal budget constraint. (8). Such a change,
maintained over time, will actually satisfy (8) if projections at date t prove to be accurate. In
32general, though, a trajectorybased on6 will not satisfy(8)in yeart+1, onceforecastsarerevised.
Assuming that forecast revisions cannot be predicted, the process A. A÷ will thus equal a
random walk. But the fact that A1 will change does not alter the fact that it represents an optimal
forecast at date t. At best (givenrecentexperience), uncertainty means that projected deficits are as
likely to rise as to fall.
It is a separate issue how the fiscal imbalance as estimated at any date should be addressed
over time. If tax rate changes are used to close the estimated fiscal gap, the simplest tax-smoothing
arguments derived from single-agent models (e.g. Barro 1979) might be used to support a policy of
implementingeachperiod's Aimmediately,and letting the tax rate follow a random walk.
Inthe real world, a varietyofcomplicationstoo numerous to mention make the solution more
difficult.It may notbe feasible or even desirable toinducelargefrequentchanges in taxrates. In the
shonrun, other macroeconomic concernsmaydominatedecisions.Moreover, with population
heterogeneity within andacrossgenerations, distributional concernsmust be added to arguments based
onminimizing the deadweight loss of taxation. Once this is done, annualpatterns ofdeficit reduction
will not tell us enough about the underlying policy being adopted, for we must know which
generations, and which individuals within generations, are bearing each year's tax increasesor
spending reductions.1 Here, the recently developed technique of generational accounting (Auerbach
ji 1991) is more appropriate, at least for evaluatingchanges in fiscalburdens acrossgenerations.Put
simply, generational accounting considers the impact on different generations of alternative ways of
satisfying the government's intertemporalbudgetconstraint,(8).
3'Such disaggregateanalysis isalso important for understandingthe macroeconomic effects of
deficits,forthewealth effects of different policies onhouseholdconsumption will vary across
members of particular generations and across generations as well. One recent attempt to consider the
macroeconomiceffects of the large long-term deficits loomingin thenext century maybefound in
U.S. General Accounting Office (1992).
33Recent calculations using generationalaccounting (0MB1994, Table 3.3) are very sobering.
Theysuggest that, should the tax burden of meeting the intertemporal budgetconstraint fall entirely on
future generations (representing, perhaps, an unrealistic delay given the magnitudeof the imbalance),
these generations will face tax burdens (net of transfers) that are more than doublewhat current policy
would indicate — an increase from 36 percent to 82 percent of the present value of lifetimelabor
income.2'
6. Conclusions
The United States federal government has appeared to reduce deficits mightily over the past
decade, without actually doing so. Deficit forecasts during this period have proved very inaccurate
and overly optimistic. There is no simple economic explanation for such errors and, while political
pressures may have played a role, the exact mechanism is not yet clear. The budget rulesof the
period may have hastened legislators to act, but were poorly designed for the purpose of restoring
fiscal balance. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act and, particularly the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act,
impounded forecasting errors in their rules, and both permitted the postponement of serious action.
Even withthe passageof the 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, the United States still
faces a major fiscal imbalance, attributable to growing health care costs and changing population
demographics. This imbalance, though enormous, is not easily identified using traditional methods of
evaluating fiscal sustainability because it is not apparent in the projections of current or near-term
deficits. Even if the growth of health care costs were stabilized within the next decade, demographics
alone would still produce large increases in the share of GDP accounted for by Social Security and
Medicare. Yet, the recent COO estimates of the impact of the Clinton health plan (COO 1994b),
2These calculations include state and local taxes and transfer payments as well as those at the
federal level.
34which project increased near-term deficits,suggestthat health care reform may actually worsen the
looming fiscal imbalances reported here.
Appendix-Estimatingthe Effects of OBRA1993for the Period 1998-2003
Thisappendix describes how the changes in deficits forecast by CBO for the period 1999-2003
from just before to just after the passage of OBRA 1993 are divided into economic, technical and
policy revisions. All calculations apply to the primary deficit, excluding interest.
I begin with the changes in the deficits forecast for fiscal years 1999-2003 in early 1993 (CR0
1993a), before OBRA 1993. and late 1993 (CBO 1993b), after OBRA. I assume that economic
changes are captured entirely by changes in the forecast of nominal GD!'. Specifically, I measure as
changes due to economic factors those changes in revenues and non-interest spending that would have
occurred had these items been held constant at their post-OBRA shares of nominal (3D!'. Technical
changes are more difficult to guess, but, fortunately, these were quite small for the reported years
1993-1998 during this interval. Given this, I simply assume that the technical revisions over this
period to estimated 1998 revenues and expenditures also apply to each of the years 1999 through
2003, as well.
Subtraction of these estimated economic and technical changes in revenues and spending yields
the estimated policy effects presented in Figure 6.
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37Table I
Revenue Forecast Revisions, 1983-1993
Years Ahead Policy Economic Technical
0 3.8 -11.9 -4.6
1 10.0 -15.2 -6.5
2 21.0 -15.7 -6.7
3 14.9 -17.6 -7.6
4 17.9 -20.7 -7.2
5 9.5 -7.2 -2.9
Total 67.9 -88.3 -35.5
Source: CBO and author'scalculationsTable 2







Variable, lagged (1.84) (-2.83)
PolicyRevision. -0.01 -0.12
lagged (-0.09) (-1.39)
Economic Revision, 0.04 -0.13
lagged (0.73) (-2.03)
Time Trend -4.50
(1985 = I) (-4.22)
-.01 .31
Number of Observations: 45
Note: t-statistics (incorporating the White (1980) standard error correction) are in parenthesesTable 3





Growth Rate + 2%:
Base Case 2.97% 4.16% 4.72%
Demographics only 2.34 3.33 3.81
Health Care GDP-adjusted 3.60 5.32 6.07
Growth Rate + 1%:
Base Case 2.52 3.88 4.80
Demographics only 1.86 3.01 3.81
Health Care GOP-adjusted 3.19 5.16 6.39
Note: Simulations labeled 'Base Case' incorporate HCFA's 1991 projections of the levels of real
health care entitlement spending from 2004 to 2030; those labeled 'Demographics only' exclude those
increases in Medicare estimated to result from increases in the relative price of health care; those
labelled "Health Care GOP-adjusted' base health care projections from 2004 to 2030 on HCFAs
original projections of health care entitlement spending as a share of GOP. These simulations show
faster health care spending growth than the base case because the original IICFA projections were


















Source: Congressional Budget Office
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